After Khamenei – Cyber Tech

On 8 March 2026, Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali Khamenei’s second son, was introduced because the third Supreme Chief, the Wali-ye Faqih.  With this appointment, the regime alerts its dedication to protect the facade of constitutional continuity surrounding Velayat-e Faqih (Mandate of the Islamic Jurist), for with out it, the regime would lose the very basis of its self-constructed political authority. The succession of Mojtaba Khamenei brings into view the regime’s incapability to use its personal legitimising rules to its rule, in addition to the deep constitutional tensions on which this technique rests.

Whereas alternate options equivalent to a secular democratic order, proposed by distinguished opposition figures, are gaining traction, the remnants of the Islamic Republic are confronted with the erosion of the system they upheld for many years.

Legitimising clerical rule

 After 47 years of theocratic rule, the constitutional basis of the Islamic Republic of Iran seems to have reached an inflection level. Following the Israeli and US strikes, the Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei died on 28 February 2026 in a bunker beneath his central compound in Tehran. The importance of his loss of life can solely be understood in opposition to the constitutional doctrine that legitimises clerical rule within the Islamic Republic.

The chief of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Ruhollah Khomeini, launched by means of his foundational work on Velayat-e Faqih a traditionally unprecedented conception of a clerical declare to state authority. In response to his doctrine, the clergy’s legitimacy to manipulate a state is grounded within the theological assumption that the Islamic jurist is vested with a divine mandate to characterize the occulted final Shia Imam Mehdi on earth. Artwork. 5 of the Structure of 1979 displays this precept by prescribing that “In the course of the Occultation of the Wali al-Asr (could God hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and management of the Ummah devolve upon the simply […] and pious […] faqih”, the Supreme Chief. As the best consultant of the hidden Imam, the Wali-ye Faqih holds a supervisory function over the political course of, while issuing spiritual rulings, equivalent to fatwas. To fulfil each a political and a spiritual function, the Wali-ye Faqih should possess a profound understanding of Islamic scholarship, since his guardianship over the state relies upon upon his theological jurisprudence.

Previous to the incorporation of Velayat-e Faqih into the Structure of 1979, the query of Velayat (authority) of the Islamic jurist had lengthy been debated throughout the Shia custom of jurisprudence. These debates have been typically marked by restraint in regards to the extent to which clerical authority ought to intrude with the general public sphere. It’s undisputed that Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) can set out authoritative guidelines for sure non-public day-to-day issues. Within the sphere of politics (siyasat), nevertheless, Islamic jurists in Iran traditionally exercised little, if any, direct authority over public affairs. By establishing a single clerical head of state, the constitutional idea of Velayat-e Faqih introduced a major rupture with this separation between siyasat (politics) and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).

The divine mandate inscribed within the Structure of 1979 provides the Wali-ye Faqih the authority to train clerical supervision in all public issues (velāyat-e moṭlaq), which has resulted in a constitutional order characterised by appreciable inside contradictions. Whereas the Structure of 1979 recognises the sovereignty of the folks and formally grants them the best to elect the president and parliament, it additionally restricts this proper virtually completely by means of the management exercised by the Faqih and his subordinate spiritual establishments. Additional, the Iranian state recognises the separation of the state into legislative, judicial and government powers, however replaces the interior checks-and-balances system in response to Artwork. 57 with “the supervision of absolutely the wilayat al-‘amr and the management of the ummah”, that’s, the Wali-ye Faqih. In spite of everything, even the basic rights listed within the Structure of 1979 are topic to the boundaries of Islamic legislation.

Since Ali Khamenei got here to energy, the centrality of the workplace of the Supreme Chief has elevated even additional. By way of the restructuring of the state and the wide-ranging affect exerted over the composition of the Expediency Discernment Council, Meeting of Consultants and Parliament, the Faqih workouts intensive and almost limitless management over all branches of presidency, in addition to state tv and the cultural sector. At present, the state’s chain of command is so profoundly influenced by this workplace that its removing would render the state, in its present kind, nearly incapable of functioning.

A regime certain by its founding doctrine

Given the system’s heavy reliance on the workplace of the Supreme Chief, the query of its succession exposes the regime’s inherent shortcomings in legitimising its declare to rule. Critics have lengthy argued that the election of the second spiritual chief, Ali Khamenei, was unconstitutional, as he didn’t fulfil the spiritual {qualifications} related to the place of the Supreme Chief and was solely later elevated to the standing of an Ayatollah.

Up till Khamenei’s election, the Chief was required to carry the rank of Marjaʿ-e Taqlid, denoting the best scholarly rank and the popularity of that authority by followers. This qualification was constitutionally diminished to the decrease rank of a Mojtahed, a scholar certified to independently train Islamic authorized reasoning. The lowered standards weakened the idea of Velayat-e Faqih, because the spiritual authority is central for its doctrinal assemble. Nonetheless, the constitutional modification was based upon debates within the Meeting for Revision of the Structure, displaying a sure dedication to conformity with the present authorized provisions.

At present, even after the required clerical rank for the potential successor had been lowered to that of a Mojtahed, the workplace remained exceedingly troublesome to fill in a fashion in line with its respective political and non secular claims to authority.

Herein lies a basic dilemma for the Islamic Republic: the regime is unable to adjust to the necessities it has set for the workplace of Wali-ye Faqih, but it continues to derive its legitimacy to rule doctrinally from this very idea. On the similar time, as a result of the precept of Velayat-e Faqih is so deeply ingrained within the regime’s institutional construction, it can’t merely be deserted. The result’s a state that adheres to the precept of Velayat-e Faqih, although it has lengthy ceased to be viable.

The subsequent Khamenei in line

With the election of Khamenei’s son, the workplace of the Supreme Chief has departed even farther from its preliminary standards and assumed traits of a hereditary type of rule traditionally contested inside Shia jurisprudence.

The twin nature of the place as a political and a spiritual chief is mirrored within the constitutional standards for his choice outlined in Artwork. 109: “a. scholarly qualification for issuing spiritual ruling [fatwa] in numerous fields of fiqh [islamic jurisprudence]. […] c. proper political and social perspicacity, prudence, braveness, administrative amenities and ample functionality for management”. The third Wali-ye Faqih, Mojtaba Khamenei, is a relatively younger scholar who has by no means printed any Islamic jurisprudence of significance. It has additionally been reported that he first entered spiritual education solely in his thirties. This strongly means that Mojtaba Khamenei doesn’t even meet the rank of Mojtahed. His political standing can’t compensate for this both, as Mojtaba Khamenei has by no means held a proper public workplace and has but to deal with the general public straight. In distinction to his father Ali Khamenei, who previous to his election served as president of the Islamic Republic and not less than fulfilled the rank of Mojtahed, his now elected son doesn’t seem to fulfill any of the {qualifications} set out in Artwork. 109 of the Structure of 1979.

Additional, Artwork. 109 of the Structure of 1979 prescribes that “In case of multiplicity of individuals fulfilling the above {qualifications} and circumstances, the particular person with higher perception in fiqh and politics shall be most popular”. Though no potential successor would have totally complied with the circumstances laid down in Artwork. 109, quite a few candidates nonetheless possessed spiritual and political credentials that clearly surpassed these of Mojtaba Khamenei.

To grasp Mojtaba Khamenei’s election, one should look at the Meeting of Consultants, which, below Artwork. 107 of the Structure of 1979, elected him as successor in a disputed emergency session. Throughout Ali Khamenei’s tenure, this 88-member clerical physique, formally composed of senior Shia students, was progressively full of Ali Khamenei’s personal loyal followers, a growth carefully tied to the long-anticipated succession of Mojtaba Khamenei.

The appointment of the brand new Wali-ye Faqih by the Meeting of Consultants could have resolved the speedy situation of succession throughout the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless, whereas the regime has lengthy since misplaced its legitimacy amongst broad sections of the inhabitants, the election of Ali Khamenei’s son exhibits that it’s not even able to adhering to the self-constructed legitimacy required for the continuation of its theocratic rule.

Since Mojtaba Khamenei doesn’t seem to get pleasure from any help among the many Iranian public, whose calls for for a secular state have turn into more and more specific, the query that now stays is how lengthy this new Supreme Chief can keep his tenuous maintain on energy.